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This paper inquires into the nature of constitutionalism in the European Union and exposes its 
character as distinctly different from at least some of the descriptive and normative 
approaches to a “constitution for 2004” that currently proliferate. The paper portrays 
constitutionalism as a subtle and intrinsically ambiguous balancing process, using the 
evolution of the EC legal order as an illustration of the wider pattern according to which the 
exercise and perhaps the very nature of State power in Europe has been moderated without 
the need to superimpose a new but geographically larger State at European level. This leads 
to anxiety that the pursuit of “constitutional finality” is capable of imperilling the very 




This paper takes as its starting point the mood that favours “constitutional finality” as the 
leitmotif of the next round of EU Treaty revision. The paper is not designed as a commentary 
on the intricacies of the papers lately presented to the Convention, nor even as a blueprint for 
the Convention. Rather, it stands back from the particularities of the Convention process. The 
paper inquires into the nature of constitutionalism in the European Community and the wider 
Union and exposes its character as distinctly different from at least some of the descriptive 
and normative approaches to a “constitution for 2004” that currently proliferate, both inside 
and outside the Convention. The paper portrays constitutionalism as a subtle and intrinsically 
ambiguous balancing process, using the evolution of the EC legal order as an illustration of 
the wider pattern according to which the exercise and perhaps the very nature of State power 
in Europe has been moderated without the need to superimpose a new but geographically 
larger State at European level. This leads to anxiety that the pursuit of “constitutional 
finality” is capable of imperilling the very foundations of the system, by robbing it of its 
adaptive character. 
 
The particular notion of devising a “hard list” of competences attributed to the Community or 
the wider Union, as part of a project to separate more precisely the role of the 
Community/Union from that of the Member State, is treated as an example of the way in 
which pursuit of constitutional finality may assign a dominant value to tidiness that 
underestimates the accompanying costs. The paper argues that the quest to deliver a “hard  
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list” of competences is vulnerable to attack for two reasons in particular - the “delayed 
reaction” problem and the “either/or” problem. The first issue, “delayed reaction”, refers to 
the point that some, perhaps most, of the anxieties that provoke scepticism about the reach of 
Community activity are already in the course of being addressed, in a web of imaginative and 
constructive re-shaping of communautaire endeavour. The second issue, “either/or”, concerns 
the risk that an antithetical over-emphasis on whether the Community/Union, on the one 
hand, or its Member States on the other can or should act tends to obscure the point that 
fundamentally both should be seen as complementing each other in the delivery of effective 
and legitimate governance for Europe. This brings the paper to the conclusion that hardening 
the demarcation of competence between the Community/Union and its Member States and, 
more generally, embracing constitutional finality in the Union may damage appreciation of 
the system as a multi-level, dynamic and relatively non-confrontational architecture designed 
to preserve the basic structure of the Member States while curing them of their congenital 
tendency to inflict political and economic damage on each other. The paper argues instead for 
an emphasis on improved transparency which is nevertheless surrounded by respect for the 
value and pragmatic good sense of much of the current trajectory of “constitutionalised” 
policy-formation and governance. 
 
 
2. Constitutional finality  
 
There has already been an investment of substantial political capital in preparing the 
intergovernmental conference that is to be convened in 2004 as a momentous episode for 
Europe. At one level the motivation is virtuous. The Declaration agreed at Nice in December 
2000 that fixes “deadline 2004” calls for “a deeper and wider debate about the future 
development of the European Union”. One could hardly object to such a dignified goal. 
Moreover, the embrace at Nice of such thoughtful inclusiveness contrasts appealingly with 
television coverage of hollow-eyed politicians tottering exhausted from the marathon 
bargaining sessions that were required to hammer out a deal, insisting that never again would 
such fundamental decisions be taken in such desperate, frenzied and ill-planned 
circumstances. One might wryly reflect that that’s what they always say, but nonetheless it is 
plain that attempts are being made to endow the 2004 process with a more open and 
constructive flavour. The Convention is plainly part of this mood. And in some quarters the 
“2004 process” is being driven by a feeling that major, mould-making decisions will and 
should be taken. 
 
This paper is, first of all, infused by mild scepticism about whether this is likely. At the very 
least, it assumes that, as is ever the way at IGCs, the “big decisions” will be reached only at 
the last moment, although it also follows that in so far as the political debate creates a 
momentum in which significant constitutional change is expected then this mood will 
combine with the political need to deliver an agreement as triumphant culmination of an IGC 
to generate something that is novel, or at least that can be presented as such. Moreover, the 
paper assumes that a significant part of the pressure to develop a radical constitutional agenda 
at the European level is dictated by the national political context in which credit may be 
gained from being seen to be a major player on the European stage (which might conversely 
mean that in other circumstances a desire to appease domestic constituencies may generate a 
calculatedly obstructive approach to deeper “Europeanisation”). That perception invites some 
further scepticism about whether the reality is likely to match the rhetoric. However, the  
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principal thesis of this paper is built around the proposition that if a grand architectural design 
for the future of the Union does not emerge in 2004, then there may be very good reason for 
treating that not as a failure but rather as a positive development. It will be argued that the 
presentation of 2004 as a potential end-destination, at which core constitutional questions will 
be “settled”, is at odds with the historical evolution of the Union, neglectful of a network of 
complex but largely inter-related devices for meeting in more sophisticated fashion the 
perceived weaknesses of the Union than would be achieved through the adoption of a formal 
constitution and, ultimately, fundamentally incompatible with how it should be seen, as a 
non-State actor which causes profound adaptation in the structure of the States that are 
members of it. In short, this paper will champion the cause of EU as process, not as static 
representation of a chosen destination. This will be explored with particular reference to the 
quest to devise a formula for dividing up State and Community competences, treating this as 
one example of a wider alluring but mistaken attempt to “find answers”. It will be contended 
that the patterns of constitutionalisation that have developed in the European Community 
and, to a lesser extent, in the broader Union have involved many deliberate but constructive 
ambiguities and a healthy dose of pragmatism from many players, and that the notion of 
elevating “constitutionalism” on to a (perceived) “higher” plane may imperil much of what 
has been achieved so far. Most of all it will be argued that the successes of the EU, at an 
economic and a political level, have been achieved largely because of the skilful manner in 
which games in which one party wins and so another is perceived to lose have been avoided. 
By contrast, the “constitution vision” is dangerous and divisive precisely because it threatens 
to insist on the triumph of one normative foundation over another. But why can’t we have it 
all?  
 
The influential German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer spoke explicitly of “constitutional 
finality”on 12 May 2000 in a speech delivered at the Humboldt University in Berlin under the 
title “From Confederacy to Federation? Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration” 
1. 
Fischer’s contribution was, of course, nuanced and sophisticated and contains much to 
admire. He argues for a division of sovereignty between the Member States and the European 
institutions. I agree with his insistence on the vital role of both the States and the Union in the 
future shaping of Europe. I admire his efforts to avoid assuming that what is at stake is the 
“either/or” question - either a European State or nation-States. And I accept the pressing need 
for fresh thinking about the system of European governance in the shadow of impeding 
enlargement. But neither the discourse of a “constitution” nor of “finality” are necessarily 
helpful additions to the debate. 
 
On the former issue, the “constitution” for Europe, there is a real risk that the argument in 
favour of improved transparency for the Union, against which one would scarcely dare to 
take issue, may be conflated with an argument directed at alteration of the legal foundations 
in order to create a European constitution that would underpin a European State. One may 
desire both. But they do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. “Constitutions” come in many 
forms and possess varied functions 
2. In fact there is a severe risk that in so far as the 
                                                 
1.   “Finalitaet” in the original German. For the speech plus accompanying discussion, see Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 7/00, available via http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/symp.html.  
2.   Cf J-C Piris, “Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?” 24 ELRev 557 (1999); 
Y Devuyst, “The European Union’s Constitutional Order? Between Community Method and Ad Hoc 
Compromise” 18 Berkely Jnl Int’l Law 1 (1999); also P Craig, “Democracy and Rule-making within 
the EC: an empirical and normative assessment” 3 ELJ 105 (1997); P Craig, “Constitutions,  
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objective of transparency is pursued under the label of Constitution-building it may provoke 
revolt against an idea that is capable of being regarded as quite different, that of further 
embellishing the State-like credentials of the European Union, with negative results for both 
causes. Symbols matter; symbols inflame 
3. And the suggestion that “finality” is or should be 
in sight is especially alarming in the light of its propensity to foreclose debates about a 
plurality of visions for “Europe”. Achieving finality suggests a process of picking winners 
and losers. This is unhealthy and destablising. It should be pursued only if the current model 
is exposed as inferior. It is my core contention that the advantages of the way things are done 
today in the Union run the risk of being under-estimated on a wave of political (but perhaps 
not popular) support for constitutional finality. To make this point it is necessary to spend 
some time examining the nature of constitutionalism in the European Community (and, much 
less visibly, in the wider non-EC EU). 
 
3. The background to constitutionalism  
 
What is meant by “constitutionalism” (as distinct from a Constitution)? In the European 
Union - most prominently in the European Community segment of the Union - 
“constitutionalism” has come to represent a useful shorthand description of the 
transformation of a regime founded on an international Treaty into a complex organisation 
that does not - cannot - set aside its Treaty-based roots and yet has evolved into something 
that is significantly more constitutionally and institutionally sophisticated than an orthodox 
international organisation and in which the supervision of the relevant actors, at national and 
transnational level, is achieved according to methods and standards than reflect the deep 
impact of policy-makers and policy-executors on the life of all European citizens. Much of 
the constitutionalising force of EC law is directed at the control of public power by judicial 
institutions not only at European level but also, and much more directly and visibly, in 
proceedings initiated by private parties at national level. It also goes to the shaping of inter-
State relations in the EC which has at least as much, and perhaps more, in common with the 
modes of internal distribution of power within a federal State as it does with the structuring of 
an international organisation established by a Treaty 
4. The principles of supremacy and 
direct effect are central to this claim that the EC legal regime operates in many respects as if 
it were organising the internal governance of a (federal) State. 
 
This reveals that “constitutionalism” has equipped the EC with a working method that allows 
it to avoid choices about whether it is “really” international law or “really” State law. It is 
both; it is neither; it doesn’t matter (in practice). The system has a remarkably strong claim to 
operate as if it were a constitutional legal order divorced from an orthodox understanding of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Constitutionalism, and the European Union” 7 ELJ 125 (2001); Special Issue: Can Europe have a 
Constitution? 12/1 Kings College Law Journal (2001); K Lenaerts and M Desomer, “Bricks for a 
Constitutional Treaty of the European Union: values, objectives and means” 27 ELRev 377 (2002). Cf, 
painting a broader picture of the role of law in European identity formation, T Mollers, “The Role of 
Law in European Integration” 48 AJCL 679 (2000). On the German debate in particular, see J 
Schwarze, “Germany” in J Schwarze (ed), The Birth of a European Constitutional Order: the 
Interaction of National and European Constitutional Law (Nomos, 2000), and, in comparative 
perspective, 554-568. 
3.  Cf B Laffan, “The European Union polity: a Union of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars” 8 
JEPP 709 (2001). 




5. This is of the highest significance to understanding how the EC 
has developed, and therefore, in my submission, it is vital to informing the current debate 
about the future. The discourse of constitutionalism has tended to induce the suspicion that 
the Community/ Union is en route to becoming a State in its own right. This is not at all a 
necessary logical progression, however, and it is at best superficial and, worse, misleading, 
both in a descriptive and a normative sense. Better, it is submitted, to treat the Community/ 
Union as acquiring State-like functions. It has constitutional features that are closely 
analogous to those found in a State. It has competences that one would expect to find within 
the State’s arsenal and it adopts legislation that takes immediate effect throughout the 
Union’s territory. But that does not mean it is or should be a State at some time in the future. 
It lacks many features crucial to a normal understanding of the State. It has negligible rule-
enforcing capacity - no army, no police force and, even in the wide range of areas where it is 
a rule-maker, it depends on national legal and administrative infrastructure to carry through 
and apply its policy choices. Its budget is relatively small (and a large proportion is spent on 
agriculture). And it possesses only the competences conferred on it by its Treaty 
6. So it is not 
a State but, more importantly, it is submitted that it should not be treated as aiming for that 
status, nor should it so aim. The Union is, in short, a response to the political and economic 
failings of States in Europe and it would sell its ambitions short, while simultaneously 
disregarding its history, if it were simply to attempt to re-establish the traditional State, albeit 
at pan-European level. This view would also look askance at suggestions that the EU suffers 
from a democratic deficit, in so far as such criticism means only that its institutional 
architecture is not the same as that of a traditional West European State. Of course it is not; 
that is the whole point. That is not simply to assert the EU’s difference, its uniqueness, as a 
sufficient defence of its current structure, but it is, at least, to insist that the EU be seen as part 
of dynamic process, itself changing over time and changing the nature of the States that are 
members of it, and accordingly its acquisition of and impacts on political power require 
assessment with reference to a more subtle benchmark than that of orthodox constitutional 
arrangements found in a State 
7. 
  
Rightly have Joerges and Sand identified constitutionalism “as a metaphor for the challenges 
that the emerging transnational governance presents to the notion of democratic legitimacy” 
8. It is vital to escape imprisonment in thinking that assumes the rise of transfrontier markets 
generates a need for geographical bigger States. Economic structures migrate in ways that do 
not have to be followed and frequently cannot be followed by political instititutions. The EU 
is part of the necessary leap of imagination which projects us towards an understanding of 
governance that transcends the State, either acting alone or in constructing inter-state 
                                                 
5.  Cf J H H Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor? (Cambridge UP, 
1999).  
6.  Article 5(1) EC; lately confirmed with vigour by the Court in Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament 
and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, “Tobacco Advertising”. 
7.  See in this direction, with extensive bibliographic survey, C Lord, “Assessing Democracy in a 
Contested Polity” 39 JCMS 641 (2001); also C Lord and D Beetham, “Legitimizing the EU: is there a 
post-Parliamentary basis for its legitimation?” 39 JCMS 443 (2001); T Zweifel, “... Who is without sin 
cast the first stone: the EU’s democratic deficit in comparison” 9 JEPP 812 (2002); A Menon and S 
Weatherill, “Legitimacy, Accountability and Delegation in the European Union” in A Arnull and D 
Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (OUP, forthcoming). 
8.  “Constitutionalism and transnational governance”, unpublished paper. See also F Snyder, “Governing 
Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law” 5 ELJ 334 (1999); B Rosamond, 
“Discourses of globalization and the social construction of European identities” 6 JEPP 652 (1999). Cf 
the Commission’s White Paper on Governance, COM (2001) 428.  
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bargains. So, from this perspective, criticism of the EU as lacking the democratic credentials 
that are characteristic of a State is not to take as given that which is contested. It is to take as 
given that which is denied. The EU is not a State nor is it to become one. This paper seeks to 
step beyond this perception and to make the case that, in fact, the very combination of 
European institutional and constitutional architecture alongside those of the Member States 
itself secures a broader sense of democratic legitimacy. This embrace of the virtues of multi-
level constitutionalism, which by definition resists “finalising”, is shown already to provide 
some answers to the problems that are perceived to afflict the Union - the “delayed reaction” 
problem - and it supplies the core of the objection to the “either/or” model, which I pursue 
below. 
 
4. The European Court and constitutionalism  
 
In the EU much of the foundation for the advance of “constitutionalism” was dug by the 
Court. In particular we must attribute a great deal of credit (if that be the right word) to the 
Court for having wrenched thinking in and about the EC away from the model of the 
orthodox international organisation and towards a system that involves a much deeper and 
more complex relationship between two levels of mutually interdependent governance, that 
of the State and that of the transnational organisation, the Community/ Union.The Court 
achieved this through its audacious early rulings on the nature of EC law. More importantly 
still, enjoying “benign neglect” from potentially critical audiences,
9 it achieved this because 
its activism was not confronted by opposition from political elites in the Member States and 
because its national courts absorbed the instructions handed out from Luxembourg and 
sustained and promoted the cause of European legal integration by treating EC law in the way 
they were instructed by the European Court 
10. 
 
The Treaty of Rome did not stipulate that Community law should be applied in national 
courts at all. And it said nothing about which legal order should prevail in the event of 
conflict between Community law and national law. Both these points were addressed by the 
Court at an early stage in the evolution of EC law. First, the application of Community law in 
national courts. In 1963 the Court decided that Community law may be directly effective, 
which means it may create legally enforceable rights before national courts and tribunals. 
This was the famous decision in Van Gend en Loos
11 in which the Court stated that: 
 
“The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, 
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states... the Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not 
only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of the 
Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals 
but is also intended to confer on them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage.” 
 
                                                 
9.  E Stein, “Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution” 75 AJIL 1 (1981). 
10.  Why? See Part 5 below. 
11.  Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1.  
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Community law is capable of direct effect in national courts. The pre-condition is only that 
the relevant provision be sufficiently clear and precise. This, for the Court, flows from the 
spirit and purpose of the Treaty.
12 
 
The second key constitutional principle asserted by the Court at an early stage is that of 
supremacy or primacy - that Community law overrides national law in the event of conflict 
between them. Again, this is not made explicit in the Treaty. But in 1964 the Court asserted 
that a hierarchy places Community law above national law. In Costa v ENEL
13 it explained: 
 
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of 
the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply..... 
.... The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in 
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty... It follows from all these observations that the law stemming 
from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and 
original nature, be overrridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without 
being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question.” 
 
Again, the principle that Community law is supreme and must prevail in the event of conflict 
with national law is drawn from the structure of the Treaty, as necessary to give effect to its 
ambitions. The Court is not deterred by the absence of explicit textual support in the Treaty; 
and the novel and independent character of Community law, explicitly contrasted with 
“ordinary international treaties”, is asserted by the Court even as it constructs that new legal 
order. 
 
So in Simmenthal the Court added that “... every national court must, in a case within its 
jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers 
on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may 
conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.” 
14 And in Factortame 
the Court declared that “Community law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court 
which, in a case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which 
precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule.” 
15 
 
The Court has also added the doubtless logical but conspicuously bold confirmation that 
Community law overrides even national constitutionally protected rights. This was first 
clearly stated in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.
16 Supremacy has a profound impact on 
national legal orders. 
 
In this way the EC legal order has been “constitutionalised”
17 by its courts. The fundamental 
                                                 
12.  On direct effect as a policy choice, see eg P Pescatore, “The Doctrine of Direct Effect: an infant disease 
of Community Law” 8 ELRev 155 (1983); F Mancini “The Making of a Constitution for Europe” 26 
CMLRev 595 (1989). 
13.  Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
14.  Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629. 
15.  Case C-213/89 [1990] ECR I-2433. 
16.  Case 11/70[1970] ECR 1125. 
17.  Eg J H H Weiler, The Constitution of Europe note 5 above, R Dehousse, The European Court of  
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constitutional characteristics of EC law have much in common with those which one would 
expect to discover in the constitution of a federal-type State. In particular, supremacy appears 
to dictate a hierarchical relationship between the two levels of law-making, placing the 
(quasi-) federal rules on top. And of course there is much more to the claim of 
“constitutionalisation”. The EC system has been developed, inter alia, to afford judicial 
protection to the individual who may be affected by the exercise of power by the Community 
institutions; general principles of Community law have been developed, in some instances 
without explicit textual support in the Treaty, which constrain the capacity to act of 
Community institutions and in some, albeit ill-defined, circumstances of national authorities 
too;
18 and the Treaty establishes institutionally relatively sophisticated forms of lawmaking 
which reflect forms of representative democracy at both national and European level, in the 
shape of the Council and the Parliament respectively. So it functions as a constitution in the 
“thin” sense that it is constitutive of the system that is the EC legal order. But the Court is 
rhetorically bolder. In Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v Parliament
19 the Court described the 
Community as “a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by 
them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty...” What seems to be 
at stake here is a constitution that is characterised by an assumption of the subjection of the 
exercise of public power to judicial control even in circumstances where this is not explicitly 
foreseen in the governing texts. The legal control of the institutions of the Community itself, 
which is what was in dispute in Parti Ecologiste Les Verts, was deepened by the Court’s 
readiness to extend its powers of review beyond those explicitly conferred by the Treaty. This 
tends towards a stronger and thicker kind of constitution, of a type that might not be readily 
associated with an organisation existing beyond the State.  
 
These are hugely sensitive issues. What is really here meant by a “constitution”?
20 And is the 
Court justified in drawing such conclusions from a text that offers relatively little explicit 
support?
21 At this stage I merely raise the questions. The Court is insisting, by combining 
direct effect and supremacy, that national courts should apply Community law and that, 
moreover, they should apply it in preference to any conflicting norm found within their 
domestic legal order. They should, if necessary, protect the Community law rights of an 
individual against preferences of that State expressed through legislation duly passed 
according to established democratic processes. And - here is the big leap forward - national 
courts in the Member States have accepted and faithfully applied these principles. It is this 
has come to make the EC legal order look different from that created by an “ordinary” Treaty 
and governed by public international law. Much of the stuff of EC law as seen from the 
vantage point of the European Court is, in fact, a good deal less distinct from orthodox public 
                                                                                                                                                        
Justice (Macmillan, 1998). 
18.  For a full survey see T Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (OUP, 1999); also U Bernitz and J 
Nergelius, General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer, 2000). 
19.  Case 294/83 [1986] ECR 1339. 
20.  Cf literature cited at note 2 above. 
21.  Cf H Rasmussen’s mould-breaking (for good and ill!), On Law and Policy in the European Court of 
Justice: a Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); also T Hartley, 
Constitutional Problems of the EU (Hart Publishing, 1999). It is submitted that criticism of the Court in 
this vein demands that attention be paid to devising a theory of legal reasoning and interpretation; cf J 
Bengoetxea, N MacCormick and L Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of 
the European Court of Justice” Ch 3 in G de Burca and J H H Weiler, The European Court of Justice 
(OUP, 2001).  
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international law than the Court’s calculated discourse of legal novelty in its early cases 
might lead one to suppose
22, but its tariff-free importation into national legal orders is what 
has really given EC law its special character. This extraordinary episode is brilliantly 
captured by Bruno de Witte: 
 
“The argument linking supremacy/ direct effect and the nature of EC law has gradually 
acquired an element of circularity. At first, supremacy and direct effect were to be recognized 
because the EC Treaty was unlike other international treaties ... But now that these principles 
have been accepted everywhere, at least for practical purposes, the direction of the argument 
is often reversed: EC law is now often being presented as being unique because it is endowed 
with direct effect and supremacy.”
23 
 
5. National courts and constitutionalism 
 
Of course there are circumstances in which one can point to threats to the European Court’s 
mission statement. International treaties are mediated in different ways through the legal 
orders of States party to those Treaties. At one level the same is true of the EC Treaty. 
Different national constitutional arrangements condition the way in which a bridge is built 
between the EC system and the national legal order.
24 Some Member States have 
constitutions which expressly provide for the application of international Treaties by 
domestic courts. In other states, including the United Kingdom, a domestic act is required to 
provide the foundation for the application by national courts of legal rules deriving from an 
international source. One might question whether these national approaches conform or are 
capable of conforming with the European Court’s own perception of the status of EC law as 
of itself “an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States ... which their courts are 
bound to apply.....”, asserted in Costa v ENEL. This might take us into a potentially 
unrewarding argument about whether EC law is an independent source of law or whether it 
depends for its force within the national systems on the existence of some bridge recognised 
by the national system. I would be provisionally content with the suggestion that both 
approaches are right - within the terms laid down by their own systems - and that it is 
unhelpful to seek a single framework within which to resolve such collisions.
25 For the truly 
remarkable thing about the constitutional architecture of the EC system is that its functioning 
largely follows the mapping project undertaken by the European Court in the early 1960s. 
National courts do accept by and large that EC law is capable of direct effect in national 
proceeedings and by and large they do not contest that within the scope of its application EC 
law prevails over national law. It may be that different national legal orders reach these 
conclusions through different routes,
26 and it may that these routes do not coincide with the 
                                                 
22.  Cf D Wyatt, “New Legal Order, or Old?” 7 ELRev 147 (1982); O Spiermann, “The other side of the 
story: an unpopular essay on the making of the EC legal order” 10 EJIL 763 (1999); F Berman, 
“Community Law and International law: How far does either belong to the other?” Ch 12 in B 
Markesinis (ed), Bridging the channel: the Clifford Chance lectures (OUP, 1996). 
23.  B de Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order” Ch 5 in P Craig and G de 
Burca, The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999). 
24.  For a summary see S Weatherill and P Beaumont, EU Law (3rd ed., Penguin Books, 1999), Ch 12; T 
Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (OUP, 4th ed, 1998), Ch 8. 
25.  Cf the splendid evasion of Article 53 found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
26.  Cf A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet and J H H Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing, 1998); J Schwarze (ed), The Birth of a European 
Constitutional Order: the Interaction of National and European Constitutional Law (Nomos, 2000).  
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purity of the constitutional vision expressed by the Court in the “heroic cases” of the 1960s. 
But, as an observable fact, EC law enjoys a depth of penetration into national legal and 
administrative culture which far transcends that of orthodox international treaties. This is the 
European Court’s great genius and this is what makes good the assertion that EC law is truly 
sui generis, occupying a space somewhere between the law of a (federal) State and the law of 
an international organisation and performing functions that are similar to those performed by 
legal rules in both those types of system. That is what makes EC lawyers a new breed, 




Quite why the European Court “got away” with this is an intriguing question. So too is the 
further question why this has only come to be a subject for polite debate relatively recently. I 
can only here summarise an increasingly rich field of research. The disinclination of political 
elites in the Member States to curb the Court’s determination to cause a dramatic escalation 
in the constitutional vigour of EC law is best understood within a framework that emphasises 
the consensual nature of decision-making in the EC.
28 For thirty years of practice, until the 
Single European Act came into force in 1987, the Council acted by unanimity. So judicial 
decisions might have surprised in so far as they deepened the practical impact of substantive 
rules, but the rules themselves were agreed only on the say-so of all (the governments of) the 
Member States. And bold interpretations of substantive law could be explained as operating 
in the collective interests of the Member States and therefore unlikely to provoke a backlash. 
This offers, for example, a plausible understanding of the Court’s ruling in Cassis de 
Dijon,29 fundamental to the acceleration of building a more efficient, transfrontier market for 
Europe. So the Court has room to craft a deeper, stronger legal order than the Member States 
might originally have foreseen because it is acting as their partially autonomous agent in 
strengthening the credibility of the outcomes of inter-state bargaining.
30 
 
This would not fully explain why national courts would be content to swallow the European 
Court’s view. There are a clutch of reasons which might help us to understand why 
supremacy and direct effect were largely absorbed by national courts. Karen Alter has 
recently published an important book which explores this matter.
31 She finds that the formal 
                                                 
27.  Contrast the “international relations” vs. “comparative (national) politics” debate on the correct 
approach to studying the EU among political scientists; eg M Pollack, “International Relations Theory 
and European Integration” 39 JCMS 221 (2001). 
28.  Cf ground-breaking work by J H H Weiler in “The Community System: the Dual Character of 
Supranationalism” 1 YEL 273 (1981); also K Alter, Establising the Supremacy of European Law (OUP, 
2001), Ch 5. 
29 .  Case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649. 
30.  This nods (in alarmingly superficial manner!) towards a rich literature using and criticising a 
principal/agent model for understanding the relationship between Member States and EC institutions, 
particularly the Commission and the Court. See eg A Stone Sweet and J Caporaso, “From Free Trade to 
Supranational Polity: the European Court and Integration”, Ch 4 in W Sandholtz and A Stone Sweet 
(eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (OUP, 1998); M Shapiro, “The European 
Court of Justice” in Craig and de Burca note 23 above; S Hix, The Political System of the European 
Union (Macmillan, 1999); D Wincott, “A Community of Law? European Law and Judicial Politics: the 
Court of Justice and Beyond” 35 Government and Opposition 3 (2000). 
31.  K Alter note 28 above. Again, early and influentially into the field, see J Weiler, “A Quiet Revolution: 
the European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors” 26 Comparative Political Studies 510 (1994). See 
also B de Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order” Ch 5 in P Craig and G 
de Burca note 23 above; W Mattli and A-M Slaughter, “The Role of National Court in the Process of 
European Integration: Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints” Ch 9 in Slaughter, Stone  
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pull of legal reasoning plays a part; so too the attraction of empowerment promised to 
national judges by the chance to apply supreme Community rules. The picture is complex and 
needs to be broken down, inter alia, according to the substantive policy sectors involved and 
according to the incentives of different courts. 
 
To revert to the purely descriptive plane, as a general proposition the judgments of the 
European Court dealing with the constitutional character of EC law were absorbed into the 
legal orders of the Member States and in practical effect they were there applied. But is this 
changing? 
 
National courts that were responsible for the willing importation of the European Court’s 
vision of the nature of EC law and its impact on domestic law are now, in the past decade, 
threatening to expel European constitutionalism (where it is perceived to have been stretched 
to illicit limits). Perhaps not surprisingly it is national constitutional courts - the judicial 
constituency that has not been empowered by the weapons of review according to the 
superior norms of European law to the degree that “ordinary” courts have newly found 
themselves able to scrutinise public acts - that have threatened to intervene. The German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, in particular, could be regarded as having challenged the 
European Court’s perceptions of the nature of EC law. The early “Solange” decision 
signalled the anxiety of the Bundesverfassungsgericht lest membership of the Community 
cause a depreciation in the standards of fundamental rights protection under German law 
32. 
The chosen tool, that was never in fact used, was the invalidation of Community acts by the 
German court for failure adequately to respect fundamental rights. Then, in the Maastricht 
ruling of 1993, anxiety about perceived improper extension of the reach of the Community 
law provoked a further threat to invalidate Community acts in Germany for want of 
competence in so far as the institutions of the Union should trespass beyond the limits of the 
competences transferred to them.
33 At one level this rejects the European Court’s view that it 
and it alone may rule on the validity of Community legislation for, were it otherwise, the 
uniformity of application and indeed the very integrity of the system would be irrevocably 
compromised.
34 More fundamental still, it is a stance which seems inconsistent with the 
European Court’s assertion that the source of validity of Community law within domestic 
legal orders is the Treaty itself and which threatens to give a practical edge to this theoretical 
lack of constitutional congruence. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and, according to different 
constitutional constructs, other leading courts in Europe seem instead to assume the source of 
validity of Community law within the national system to be located within, and therefore 
limited by, that national system. Specifically, an interpretation that leads to an extension in 
Community competence beyond the limits of the Treaty, into areas that could be occupied 
only consequent on an amendment to the Treaty, would be invalid in Germany even if the 
European Court is of the view that the extension is valid under Community law. 
 
One may object (among a great many other objections
35) to an inherent selfishness on the part 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sweet and Weiler note 26 above.. 
32.  [1974] 2 CMLR 549. 
33.  [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
34. Case  314/85  Foto Frost v HZA Lubeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
35.  For a flavour of the debate see Eg M Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court” 31 
CMLRev 235 (1994); H-P Ipsen, “Zehn Glossen zum Maastricht-Urteil” 29 Europarecht 1 (1994); J 
Wieland, “Germany in the European Union: the Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht” 
5  EJIL 259 (1994); M Zuleeg, “The European Constitution under Constitutional Constraints: the  
 
12
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its willingness to impose costs on other Member States. 
The virtuous claim that invalidation would apply only to German territory has a formal 
propriety that would rapidly be overtaken in practice, as the integrity of the Community legal 
order would likely unravel under the pressure of anxiety among other constitutional courts 
not to be seen to hold less scrupulous sensitivity than their German counterparts.
36 In this 
sense this offers a strong example of the point that national decision-making may in a 
European context be insufficiently representative of the full constituency of affected interests, 
and it makes a normative case for locating the decision on legal validity at European level. 
 
But, of course, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s stance is at one level very serious indeed. It 
throws up the possibility of a national court and the European Court disagreeing on the 
validity of an adopted act. Who would be “correct”? And who would win? 
 
There is a huge attraction in limiting discussion of such questions to the abstract. A concrete 
case of division of opinion on such a matter would be a major crisis. But there has been no 
such concrete case. And it is crucial to the thesis of this paper that it is not merely good 
fortune that no such actual disagreement has occurred. Rather, all relevant actors possess 
incentives to avoid a direct collision. Threats can be productive in so far as they may generate 
concessions or, more constructively, a re-balancing of a relationship. Once a threat is 
executed things may never be the same again, both as between the (judicial) parties to the 
dispute and, by a process of spillover, in application to other interested parties as well. The 
parties know this. They want to avoid “deciding” big questions which probably cannot be 
decided to the satisfaction of both parties. By declining to answer the question, no one overtly 
wins but no one loses either, and both parties maintain their own position to mutual 
advantage. In this sense, in fact, both win. 
 
So one might be naif to expect a national court not to be tempted to express the sort of 
sentiments about the virtue of national democracy expressed in the Maastricht decision by 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht. And it is by no means a specifically German perspective that 
there is a core of national constitutional principles that cannot be transferred 
37. But once 
these anxieties are placed in a context of an evolving European constitutionalism the hard 
edges of political and legal nationalism can be smoothed away, and the wider implications of 
decisions on the transnational environment can be indirectly mixed in. It is an extraordinary 
balancing act.  
 
So the Bundesverfassungsgericht has not done what it said can - it has not invalidated EC acts 
for the purposes of their application on German territory. Better to threaten rather than to 
execute. And to expect a response from the European Court. In this way mutually satisfying 
indirect constitutional conversations develop. It is not difficult to identify a linking chain 
between the first “Solange” decision
38 and the development of fundamental rights protection 
by the European Court. In maintaining the logical purity of the principle of supremacy, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
German Scenario” 22 ELRev 19 (1997); Papers by Weiler, MacCormick, Preuss, Grimm and Habermas 
in Special Issue on Sovereignty, Citizenship and the European Constitution 1/3 ELJ 219-307 (1995). 
36.  Cf in particular the comparable approach subsequently taken by the Supreme Court of Denmark, 
summarised in Weatherill and Beaumont note 24 above p451. See H Rasmussen, “Confrontation or 
Peaceful Co-Existence?” Ch 24 in D O’Keeffe (ed), Judicial Review in European Union Law: Liber 
Amicorum Gordon Slynn (Kluwer, 2000). 
37.  Schwarze note 2 above 496-501. 
38.  [1974] 2 CMLR 549.  
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Court decided that Community law overrides even national constitutionally protected rights, 
which prompts the genuine anxiety, expressed in “Solange” by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
that a decrease in individal legal protection could occur. But the Court also insisted that 
Community law respects fundamental rights standards, and that these are inspired by the 
European Convention and by national constitutional tradition and that Community acts 
dipping below such standards will be annulled.
39 Whether or not the European Court is 
serious about the protection of fundamental rights or whether instead this was a device to 
sweeten national courts into accepting the full implications of the supremacy doctrine is a 
matter that has caused controversy.
40 But the German courts accepted that so long as 
protection of fundamental rights was sufficiently assured at Community level, they would not 
intervene to review Community acts against domestic standards.
41 
 
A positive reading of this episode would be that “supremacy” is not all that it may initially 
appear. It succeeds only if national courts are persuaded by the Court’s case in favour of it. 
So the quality of the Court’s reasoning and, in particular, its commitment to ideals that limit 
the exercise of public power, affect the practical vitality of Community law in national legal 
orders. And national courts are actively able to shape the Community legal order, by this 
(indirect) transmission of anxieties about the direction taken or to be taken by the European 
Court. They participate precisely because without them, Community law is fatally weakened, 
and therefore supremacy is, because of the dependence of the Court on its national judges for 
the practical application of the law, a process that involves a greater degree of inter-court 
dialogue than one might expect. And so the sceptical “Solange I”was followed by the more 
receptive “Solange II”
42 after an intervening period in which the European Court attended to 
the elaboration of the protection of fundamental rights as part of the general principles of the 
Community legal order. And, I submit, there is a comparable perceptible cause-and-effect 
between the Maastricht decision’s anxiety about the need vigorously to police the outer limits 
of Community competence and, for example, the European Court’s recent annulment of the 
Tobacco Advertising Directive as lying beyond the Treaty-defined limits of Community 
competence,
43 a decision that is one of several in recent years in which the Court has 
carefully shown itself conscious of the need to pay explicit heed to the distinction between 
Treaty interpretation (which it is allowed to perform) and Treaty amendment (which it is 
not).
44 It may initially appear a paradox of supremacy in that the European Court is 
consistently restricted in asserting its power by the need to play the art of the possible, but it 
presents an appealing system of interaction between the leading courts of Europe, albeit that 
it is plainly dependent also on national judges paying due heed to the wider implications of 
their own rulings on Community law. And here too the dynamic nature of the relationship is 
                                                 
39.  Cf P Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, 1999); Tridimas n 18 above Ch 6; K Lenaerts, 
“Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union” 6 Columbia Jnl 
Euro Law 1 (2000). 
40.  Cf J Weiler and N Lockhart’s famously fiery “Taking rights seriously: the European Court and its 
fundamental rights jurisprudence” 32 CMLRev 51 (1995). 
41.  Compare “Solange I” [1974] 2 CMLR 549 with “Solange II” [1987] 2 CMLR 225. Cf J Kokott, 
“Report on Germany” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler note 26 above; Dehousse note 17 above 
62-66.  
42.  Note 41 above. 
43.  Case C-376/98 note 6 above, and further Part 7.2 below. 
44.  Eg Opinion 2/94 on accession to the European Convention on Human Rights [1996] ECR I-1759; Case 
C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325. Cf Rasmussen et al note 21 above on the problem 
of locating this distinction; also S Weatherill, “Activism and Restraint in the European Court of 
Justice”, forthcoming.  
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visible. The Bananas decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered in 2000
45 is 
consciously presented as conforming to the Maastricht ruling, and in form it does indeed so 
conform. But the tone is different. Maastricht carries a heavy emphasis on what could go 
wrong at European level and how the German court would respond. Bananas is more overtly 
concerned to emphasise the need to keep such intrusion to extreme circumstances. The signs 
of supportive, respectful interaction between courts in Europe are evident, underpinned by an 
anxiety on both sides, national and Europe, to avoid direct confrontation in which there must 
be winners and losers. 
 
That would mean that the reality of dialogue between courts has already escaped the 
“either/or” assumption of constitutional hierarchy found in the doctrine of supremacy. There 
is a complex, layered reality of dialogue and persuasion. And there is a “practical 
concordance” between the attitudes to the status of EC law held at national level and in the 
European Court
46 which reflects the inter-dependence of legal orders in Europe which itself 
reflects (and promotes) economic and political interdependence.  
 
This exultation could readily be criticised as bold but complacent and susceptible to 
falsification any day by a cantankerous national court. But how better to resolve this 
constitutional collision? A “final” resolution could be achieved only by insisting that one 
legal order has supreme authority over another. But which, among the Member States, would 
agree to a Treaty provision asserting the primacy of EC law? Which, aware of the need to 
secure credibility in the enforcement of the rules of the EC game, would see the value in 
agreeing to a provision placing national law at the apex? Better, in my view, to avoid 
formalising the situation. If the European Court’s view of the nature of EC law cannot be 
reconciled with that of the national courts, let us accept that we have seen constructed over 
the last forty years a quite spectacular success story, according to which both Community and 
State systems successfully co-exist. This is the ambiguity and pragmatism to which I refer; 
supremacy and direct effect operate successfully precisely because they are outwith the 
formal text of the Treaty and they are instead subject to elaboration and application in an 
institutional system that cherishes dialogue. The key point is that the legal approach to the 
exercise of State power in areas covered by the EC Treaty has been profoundly changed 
without an overt constitutional moment
47 or least without anything perceived as such. 
 
So “constitutionalism” depends on ambiguity and on creating arenas for problem-solving 
(which might involve problem-avoiding) within an overall system which emphasises the 
neceesary interconnection of national and European constitutional legal orders. In so far as it 
is an attempt to provide an arena within which law and politics can co-exist it is inevitably 
characterised in Europe by a certain imprecision for, after all, what is at stake is nothing less 
than a challenge to the hegemony of national constitutional law and the development of a 
legal order that involves a re-distribution of power. In fact the system works precisely 
because each participants can rest its consent to involvement on different bases which may be 
                                                 
45.  2 BvL 1/97, 7 June 2000. For discussion see C Schmid, “All Bark and no Bite: Notes on the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Banana Decision” (2001) 7 ELJ 95; G Nicolaysen and C Nowak, “Teilrueckzug 
des BVerfG aus der Kontrolle der Rechtmaessigkeit gemeinschaftlicher Rechtsakte” 54 NJW 1233 
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constitutionally irreconcilable in a purely formal sense but which do not cause any practical 
need to choose. It would be problematic only if there was some attempt to find the “correct” 
answer - that is, to adjudicate who is the winner and who the loser - the either/ or question.
48 
That is what is to be avoided; and that is where “constitutional finality” is perilous.
49 Both 
sources of authority, national and European level, have complementary roles to play.
50 The 
current constitutionally pluralist pattern permits this. 
 
 
6. The case for “constitutional finality” re-assessed 
 
What, then, is the case for “constitutional finality”, if the system of constitutionalism is 
working so well? We have a supple constitution already, based on pragmatism.
51 
 
One response to this inquiry is to retort that, in fact, the “2004 debate” has much of the 
ambiguous merit I have identified above as worthwhile in underpinning the evolution of the 
EU. That is to say, the notion of a “constitution” in the EU is being employed in different 
ways and for different reasons. That may be so. There is, however, potential damage to be 
done in the presentation of 2004 as a final destination. My primary concern is with the 
question of dividing up the respective competences of the Community and of the Member 
States, although I take the view that this issue raises questions and problems that are of more 
general relevance. The argument in favour of addressing the question of competence division 
appears to run roughly as follows. That the Community has over-stepped the mark; that this is 
damaging to its legitimacy and (not unconnected) to its capacity to deliver efficient and 
responsive governance; that therefore a much clearer control must be imposed over the scope 
of Community activity. I do not take serious issue with this agenda as a basis for debate but I 
object to the failure adequately to appreciate how much has already been achieved in 
addressing these perceived problems of over-ambition at Community level and I oppose in 
particular the notion that we would be served by a hard list of Community competences as a 
means to clean up and clarify the issue of who does what in governing Europe. 
 
In tackling the question why there may be an impetus towards a “Constitution”, or at least 
towards a firmer constitutional basis for separating out Community from State competences, I 
believe that it is necessary to begin with a diversion, but one that seems to me to be vital in 
understanding the current trajectory of the EU project. My contention is that the defining 
moment for the EC as we currently view it was the entry into force of the Single European 
Act in 1987 and the injection of the qualified majority voting in Council (“QMV” hereafter) 
as the norm in many areas of Community legislative activity. Here, surely, was where State 
                                                 
48.  So the Court’s hint in Opinion 1/91 on the draft EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6084 that some parts of 
the EC system are of such importance that they could not be modified by the Member States (esp paras 
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50.  See further below Part 9. 
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power mediated through the EC was transformed into something radically different, and less 
crude, than the simple power of veto. Qualified majority voting has been extended into new 
areas of legislative activity of the EC by the subsequent Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam 
and Nice and even into the non-EC EU; the functional competence of the Community itself 
has been steadily enhanced on periodic Treaty revision while enlargement has added new 
participants. Geoegraphical and functional expansion might seem to demand Qualified 
Majority Voting in place of a limiting rule of unanimity in order to make the process viable 
but it brings severe tensions as States realise they can be outvoted in ever wider areas of 
activities. Moreover, the adopted rules are supreme and they are capable of direct effect - 
which is to say the Court’s long-established judgments on the constitutional relationship 
between Community and national law suddenly assumed a different hue in a world of 
Qualified Majority Voting. Community law plays a vital role in holding States to the bargains 
agreed at European level and its contribution to making credible those commitments serves as 
a persuasive explanation for the acquiesence of national political elites in the Court’s 
groundbreaking decision-making in the early years of the EC. But the rise of “QMV” in the 
legislative procedure ruptures the direct link between Community law as a system susceptible 
to vigorous enforcement and the ability of the Member States to use veto power as a means of 
guarding the gate through which rules must pass before becoming invested with that legal 
force.
52 To be clear: even in a world of QMV it is not the case that States are outvoted day in 
day out,
53 nor even that the preferences of an “outvotable” state are ignored.
54 But a regime of 
QMV, in place of unanimity, generates a quite distinct and sharper appreciation of the 
importance of defining the limits of Community competence from that which prevailed in 
times when an anxious State knew the Council acted only if every State was in agreement and 
that therefore ultimately it could refuse to budge. 
 
This would lead one to suppose that the Single European Act ought to have been political 
dynamite, but in fact there was a delayed reaction before sceptical national politicians, 
academics and national courts cottoned on to what had happened. A major element in the lack 
of sharp attention to widespread potential use of “QMV” lay in the association of the switch 
in voting rules under the Single European Act with the “simple” fact of market building. The 
project to complete the internal market by the end of 1992, underpinned by the Single 
European Act’s injection of a new base for legislative harmonisation (Article 100a, now 
Article 95) to which the “QMV” rule applied, was skilfully depicted as politically neutral but 
economically beneficial. The Commission, under the politically astute direction of Jacques 
Delors, presented “1992” as a simple rationalisation of the well-established objective of 
market integration, built around the accepted principle of (non-absolute) mutual recognition 
of technical standards set out by the Court in Cassis de Dijon
55 and supported by wonderfully 
positive data on the economic gains prepared the team headed by Paolo Cecchini. It was 
brilliant packaging; to oppose the “Cecchini Report” that was to argue for the unarguable, for 
“non-Europe”.
56 
                                                 
52.  The linkage of normative supranationalism to decisional intergovernmentalism famously explored by 
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The idea of neutrality in the process was never realistic. Some astute commentators noticed 
this at the time.
57 Subsequent research has emphasised the extraordinary depth and breadth of 
“re-regulatory” activity that has necessarily accompanied the agenda of European market-
building, involving (among other consequences) significant empowerment of European-level 
actors displacing national actors.
58 But at the time this change, deceptively advertised as a 
politically non-committal exercise in improving economic performance, slipped through 
under the radar of those who would be alert to fundamental constitutional change. Many of 
the protests that made ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, agreed in 1991 but entering into 
force only in 1993, such a rocky road should really have been unleashed some years earlier. 
They were, in fact, not specific to that Treaty at all but rather related to judicial and 
legislative practice extending back over several decades, but placed in a different context by 
the rise of “QMV”. The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment in Maastricht fits that 
description. So too some academic criticism of judicial “activism” published in the 1990s but 
largely dealing with cases from much earlier.
59  
 
In fact, the tendency for critical reaction to EU choices to be delayed is still prominent. I 
make the case that a significant element of the argument for a final constitutional settlement 
of the relationship between Community and State competences is driven by a gross under-
appreciation of how much has already been achieved in finding a delicate way of balancing 
the relationship between the powers of the Community and the Member States. 
“Constitutional Finality” is at one level a solution to a problem that has already attracted 
some (overlooked) solutions as the Community and the Member States have established a 
savoir-vivre with the practice of qualified majority voting. This now requires exploration. 
 
7. Questions of legitimacy 
 
What has happened, initially unnoticed, is that “QMV”, above all, generated an anxiety 
among States willingly stripped of their veto to find other and typically more subtle ways of 
“controlling” the process of EC policymaking. Put another way, functions exercised at 
Community level, which were anyway increasingly wide-ranging, could no longer be 
legitimated simply by the fact that they represented the unanimous choice of the Member 
States to act jointly at European level, thereby better to perform tasks that would potentially 
elude the capabilities of States acting alone, bilaterally or in a less sophisticated multilateral 
framework. The responses to this alleged legitimacy crisis are varied.
60 But they can helpfully 
be grouped around two distinct types.
61 One insists on the depth and breadth of the political 
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and moral responsibility to which the EU is and should be subject (Part 7.1) while the other 
seeks to pay attention to the setting of limits on the powers that the EU exercises, thereby to 
preserve national control (Part 7.2). 
 
7.1. Legitimacy sited at European level 
 
I offer here no more than a brief overview of features that demonstrate the enhancement of 
the political and moral responsibility assumed by the EU in the light of the widening of its 
activities beyond the economic coupled with the (correct) assumption that 
legitimation/supervision according to national-level control is inadequate and in fact is 
defeated by the very fact that the transnational level has become the key site for 
policymaking and action. 
 
The Parliament has been the big winner in successive Treaty revision (albeit much less 
strikingly so at Nice, admittedly). One might take this a tacit admission by the Member States 
that the “democratic credentials” of the organisation are thereby enhanced and, under the 
influence of broadening of competence and extension of majority voting in Council, that they 
should be enhanced. It represents an assumption that European-level democracy needs to be 
improved and that the system cannot rely for its legitimacy on its foundations in the 
(democratic) Member States coupled with its functionally limited capacity. 
 
European Citizenship, the Maastricht innovation, took the rhetoric, if not necessarily the 
substance, on to a new plane. Citizenship does not have to be associated with States. A 
European Citizenship does not at all imply a transfer of status from State to European level. 
Indeed Article 17(1) EC provides that “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not 
replace national citizenship.” But the very language of “Citizenship” suggests an attempt to 
convey something of the shifting sands of allegiance and legitimacy that flow from the 
deepening role of the European Union, and to add a (supplementary) European level of 
democratic legitimacy. It has not done very well on this score. But it could. In so far as it 
involves the construction of a sense of European identity which is, first, in supplement to and 
not in replacement for national loyalties and, second, built around social values not ethnicity 
or nationhood, then European Citizenship has some potential for developing an appealingly 
inclusive notion of political belonging.
62 Such dynamic notions of Citizenship have the 
potential to generate a richer process than that which appears to be assumed and preferred by 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Maastricht ruling.
63There, the court identified obstacles 
to the transfer of essential State functions to supra-State level that could be overcome only 
once democratic legitimacy nourishes the European level - which, the Court seemed to 
consider, was far away if ever achievable, and, it seems, not even desirable. It may be true 
that the loyalty of the peoples of Europe to European-level governance is, as a general 
proposition, weaker than the bond linking them to State-level decision-making, not least 
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because of the absence of true European political parties and a European media.
64 But this 
does not mean that a deep cleavage between the two levels is necessarily desirable or 
enduring. One may express considerable discomfort with the static presentation of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht which appears to use the assumption of a connection between 
shared identity and a consequently legitimate representative unit as a basis for excluding 
mutation and in particular extension of the shared vision, with the exclusionary and 
restricting result that any impetus towards changing identity can itself be regarded as 
normatively unacceptable.
65 One may therefore argue for a distinct form of European 
identity-formation built around shared constitutional values.
66 This would not be static but 
would be susceptible to development and, in particular, to widening. This could begin to help 
to underpin multiple sites of political authority with a degree of social legitimacy and begin 
to challenge approaches based on membership of a single political community as 
descriptively and normatively orthodox. But notwithstanding the Commission’s oft-stated 
claim that the insertion of the Citizenship provisions into the Treaty has elevated the status of 
the people to a new constitutional plane in the Community legal order,
67 relatively little that 
has happened subsequently on either the legislative or the judicial plane to the Union Citizen 
born on 1 November 1993 has put flesh on these bones. The Court’s declaration in 
Grzelczyk
68 that Union Citizenship is “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States” may provide a new propulsion. 
 
Fundamental rights protection in the EU is central to the elaboration of a richer political 
discourse.
69 Article 6 EU, a Maastricht innovation, commits the Union to observe 
fundamental rights, although the Court’s jurisdiction to apply that provision is confined to the 
circumstances envisaged by Article 46 EU. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced new 
provisions in this area, although, perhaps surprisingly, they were directed at exercising 
control over recalcitrant Member States rather than the institutions of the Union. This is 
Article 7 EU. The latest boost to fundamental rights protection in the Union is supplied by the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights. This was agreed as a non-binding legal document by the 
Parliament, Council and Commission at Nice in December 2000.
70 The Charter is a strong 
candidate for inclusion in any more formal, “constitution-type” document drafted under the 
auspices of the intergovernmental conference that will begin in 2004. It will be intriguing to 
see how the elaboration of rights-based protection develops. How far into the economic, 
social and political sphere will “rights” be taken? The Charter is a peculiar mix of the more 
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familiarly communautaire economic rights and broader social and political rights that have 
been more peripheral to the EC’s activities, though the assembly of these rights in a single 
document may itself secure its transformative impact. What relationship with the Strasbourg 
system of human rights protection will be evolved?And will, as Reich has argued should 
follow, there be a readiness to extend Article 230 to provide for a special constitutional 
complaint by a citizen aggrieved by a Community act that bears on that person’s fundamental 
rights?
71 More generally still, one may consider whether the relatively open, participatory 
nature of the Charter’s drafting process will come to challenge the more closed 
intergovernmental conference as the paradigm for reform of the EU. This, of course, is 
germane to the ambitions of the current Convention. Human rights as such represent a 
powerful rallying call in any polity and the Charter is capable of serving the EU well as a 
basis for generating or, in some States, re-generating popular support
72 but, moreover, it is 
submitted that the very debate itself is constructive and capable of replenishing interest in and 
enthusiasm for the sense of a European dimension to political culture.
73 It has rather more 
appeal than the sight of haggard political elites stumbling blinking into the cold light of dawn 
after they have finally struck a deal to conclude an intergovernmental conference, leaving 
their officials to work out as best they can what actually was decided as the night dragged on. 
So in both content and process the Charter could assist in the generation of something to 
which one could point as a concretisation of shared supra-State values uncontaminated by 
nationalistic edge. 
 
These are trends that I would treat as indicative of an impetus towards recognising the 
enormous political and legal clout of the Community. It has been felt accordingly that 
European democratic credentials should be attached to the process and that European notions 
of citizenship and fundamental rights protection should be available. This stands for the 
growth of rule-making power and accompanying legal political responsibility at European 
level. But, apparently moving in the opposite direction, are signals of anxiety even scepticism 
about the accretion of power at European level. 
 
7.2. Legitimacy sited at State level 
 
“Subsidiarity” is the slogan most prominently associated with the perception that the 
Community has become too ambitious and that the intensity of its policy-making should be 
curtailed in favour of a greater respect for the autonomy of the Member States’ regulatory 
preferences. This, in fact, is not what the version of subsidiarity found in the Treaty states. It 
provides a more balanced formulation of the need to assess without preconception where lies 
the most efficient level of governance in Europe. According to Article 5(2) EC the 
Community shall take action “only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” So only if all 
things are equal (which they never are) is there a built-in preference for State action. 
 
Subsidiarity is properly taken as part of a mood of devoting closer attention to the merit of 
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Community intervention. The evolution of EC law has been characterised by its outward 
spread. The EC Treaty confers defined competences on the Community, but it does not make 
explicit the residual areas of exclusive national competence. “Protecting” such areas of 
exclusive national competence is accordingly awkward, at least once the naked political fact 
of veto power in Council as a means of halting unwelcome legislative ambition has been 
surrendered. Under the influence of both the political and the judicial institutions of the 
European Community, national systems have become gradually subject to EC incursion “in 
ever wider fields”.
74 There is no STOP! sign; more fully, “there simply is no nucleus of 
sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community”.
75 
Subsidiarity may be treated as a PAUSE! sign - pause and consider whether the Community 
should act. But there is no sector-specific suppression of Community competence under the 
subsidiarity principle. 
 
Subsidiarity, a chameleon concept, possesses the initially unsettling yet in fact rather creative 
“capacity to mean all things to all interested parties - simultaneously”.
76 It is, to my mind, of 
value if it sets up a context for debate. Subsidiarity has the potential to serve as a basis for 
applying in specific cases the general notion of a complementary relationship that prevails 
between State and European level and, in addition, for capturing the essential point that both 
actors are involved in the governance of Europe, albeit that their contributions will vary 
sector by sector. In fact much of the story of subsidiarity through the 1990s has been tied to 
attempts to convert it from vague aspiration of good governance into operationally useful 
instrument, politically and perhaps also legally. Most notable in this vein is the Amsterdam 
Protocol which provides inter alia that “For any proposed Community legislation, the reasons 
on which it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for concluding that a Community 
objective can be better achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative or, 
wherever possible, quantitative indicators”. So, for example, Directive 2000/31 on electronic 
commerce
77 asserts in its Preamble that”... by dealing only with certain specific matters 
which give rise to problems for the internal market, this Directive is fully consistent with the 
need to respect the principle of subsidiarity ....”. Mere lip-service perhaps, one may ruefully 
suspect, but in so far as subsidiarity opens up the debate about how and why the Community 
chooses to act, it is capable of playing a fruitful role in the construction of a rational agenda 
for devising the proper relationship between the EC and the Member States. 
 
There are other more specific, more operationally useful devices for fixing the limits of 
Community competence. It is frequently and correctly observed that periodic Treaty revision 
has expanded Community competence, but one should also be aware how carefully defined 
the new competences have tended to be. For example, the Community has lately been 
allowed competence to act in the fields of public health, consumer protection and culture. But 
it is not a broad competence. It is a competence defined as supplementary to that of the 
Member States. The Community may, for example, adopt incentive measures, but 
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harmonisation of public health laws is explicitly excluded by Article 152(4). The same is true 
of cultural policy under Article 151(5). Harmonisation in such areas is excluded under the 
new Treaty provisions. This proviso was a major reason for the legislature’s unsuccessful 
attempt to fit harmonisation of tobacco advertising rules under Article 95 (ex 100a). In the 
“Tobacco Advertising” judgment the Court itself joined the cause of insisting on the 
seriousness with which the limits of the Community’s attributed competence must be taken 
when it annulled Directive 98/34 on application by Germany, which had been outvoted in 
Council.
78 The Court insisted that the Treaty confers on the EC no “general power to regulate 
the internal market”
79 and found that the Directive, which imposed a wide-ranging ban on the 
advertising of tobacco products in the Member States, did not contribute to market-building 
to the extent required to cross the threshold for valid reliance on the legal base governing the 
harmonisation of laws in (what is now) Article 95 of the Treaty. Put another way, the Court - 
by implication - treated this as an invalid attempt to develop a harmonised public health 
policy at Community level, a matter which is not within Community competence. It is 
submitted that in a regime of “QMV” it is especially
80 appropriate that the Court should 
police the constitutional bounds of valid Community action, and refuse to accept that a 
political majority can, in effect, assume responsibility for fixing the reach of the Treaty. 
There is much in the “Tobacco Advertising” judgment that resembles the types of anxiety 
found in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ruling in Maastricht and if the European Court has 
been in part motivated to take a stand on the need to assert a practical constitutional 
dimension to fixing the reach of Community competence by unease that if were not so 
vigilant then it may find its position usurped by militant national constitutional courts, then so 
much the better for the development of a vibrant inter-court constitutional dialogue in 
Europe. 
 
One might imagine subsidiarity would be a key element in the judicial control of legislative 
ambition. An interesting question is why subsidiarity was not discussed by the Court in its 
“Tobacco Advertising” judgment.
81 A formal answer would be that the Court was concerned 
only with Article 5(1) EC and once it had concluded, in line with that paragraph, that the 
matter fell outside the Community’s attributed competence, then subsidiarity under Article 
5(2), dealing with the exercise of competence, simply did not come into play.
82 It is therefore 
odd to discover in the July 2001 Green Paper on European Contract Law
83 that the 
Commission it is actively seeking to uncover areas in which the market is malfunctioning 
because of deficiencies in the existing package of harmonised contract law; and that these are 
(likely to be) the areas in which future harmonisation will be focused. The Green Paper’s 
presentation is in terms of the need to comply with the principle of subsidiarity; but might 
this not truly be more a question of whether there is even a competence to harmonise national 
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contract law? That is, the Commission has rushed to Article 5(2) without first addressing the 
dictates of Article 5(1). However, it may be that the distinction matters little in practice, if at 
all. The application of the principle of conferred powers (Article 5(1) EC) and the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(2)) involve closely similar inquiry. Functionally, 
subsidiarity and attributed competence have much in common, of course, and both have come 
to the fore, the one earlier than the other, precisely because of the need to fix on methods for 
setting limits to Community action in the context of a relaxation of political grip that might 
tend to generate (qualified) majority-driven centralisation. 
 
The broader point is the function of the Court in a climate of “competence sensitivity”. It is 
not to argue complacently that the relationship between the competence of the EC and that of 
the Member States is unproblematic. It is instead to argue that such problems are currently 
under interrogation. 
 
It is also significant to an appreciation that the transfer of power under the Treaty is not all 
one-way that the competences that the Community has gradually added to its list beyond the 
arena of market building typically involve the establishment of minimum standards only. 
Articles 176, 137 and 153 EC, governing competence to legislate in the fields of 
environmental protection, social policy and consumer protection respectively, stipulate that 
national measures that are stricter than the agreed Community standard are permitted, 
provided they are compatible with the Treaty. Such a measure establishes a common EC-
wide rule, but as a minimum only, as a floor above which Member States may introduce 
stricter rules up to the ceiling set by the Treaty itself, in particular by the rules of free 
movement. This may be taken to represent confirmation that integration and uniformity are 
inapt as paramount guiding values in such realms and that space should be preserved for 
diverse local preference and for regulatory experimentation.
84 
 
It can therefore be seen that at times of Treaty revision States have embraced a formal 
expansion of competence and agreed the exercise of powers to be subjected ever more 
frequently to qualified majority voting; but this has been accompanied by the insertion from 
1993 of the subsidiarity principle, a general provision addressing the question of when the 
Community should exercise its competence to act, alongside other more specific textual 
limitations on the reach of Community action. This is part of the bargain struck and still 
being struck on what shall be the impact on the scope of permitted Community action of the 
rise of potential dissentient minorities unable to rely on voting power in Council to apply a 
brake.
85 In the context of this paper, the key argument is that already the perception that the 
Community may be over-reaching itself is being addressed; and that a drive to use the 2004 
IGC to harden the division of competence between States and Community risks overlooking 
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or undervaluing existing methods of re-balancing. 
 
Much more general manifestations of anxiety to control the expansion of the Community’s 
influence can be grouped under the general heading of flexibility. This is a many-headed 
beast
86 but loosely what is at stake is the development of collaborative inter-State endeavour 
which does not necessarily involve orthodox communautaire method nor the participation of 
all the Member States. Room is left for the expression of local preference; the Community 
does not simply swallow up the sector. Scope for opting out, the provisions on enhanced co-
operation invented at Amsterdam and the open method of co-ordination
87 all fit on this 
agenda. The Commission’s White Paper on Governance
88 is also receptive to new methods 
for doing the Union’s business - although not receptive enough for some commentators.
89 
 
The provisions on closer co-operation introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam have particular 
appeal because they attempt to establish a framework within which new endeavours falling 
within the scope of Community competence may be pursued by some, but not all, Member 
States. The procedure seems to promote managed and non-exclusionary deepening of 
collaborative endeavour by most, but not all, Member States. Variation occurs sector-by-
sector, diminishing the risk of a generally applicable deep rift between hard core States and 
an outer rim. The opportunity for advance other than at the pace of the slowest members of 
the convoy seems especially vital in the light of the next load to be placed on the EC/EU 
system, enlargement to the East. In this sense, these new provisions on closer co-operation 
could be regarded as the key to resolving the “widening or deepening” debate - they promise 
both, albeit at the (now inevitable) price of abandoning the uniformity of application of the 
law. In fact, the threshold criteria are rather demanding and the provisions have not yet been 
used. At Nice they were lightly tweaked to loosen the restrictions. Closer co-operation has a 
particularly positive constructive potential, for (unlike subsidiarity) it breaks the simplistic 
State or Community confrontation and suggests layered alternatives in between. Of particular 
salience to this paper, flexibility, which has become a landmark feature of the EU’s 
constitutional terrain, shows the dynamic nature of the process and challenges limiting 
assumptions that constitutionalism has a necessary anchorage in fixed reference points.
90 And 
again it raises anxieties that the drive towards harder competence division in 2004 may 
neglect what has already been achieved in pursuit of a reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the Union and its Member States. 
 
8. The appeal of multi-level constitutionalism 
 
The juxtaposition of devices and symbols that insist on the depth and breadth of the political 
and moral responsibility to which the EU is subject alongside other instruments that pay more 
sceptical attention to the setting of limits on the powers that the EU exercises may seem to 
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carry a paradoxical whiff. In the former instance, the EU appears to be treated as if it were a 
State or at least something closely akin to one, in the latter the EU’s credentials as a 
functionally limited international organisation are on display. But it is not a paradox precisely 
because the State/non-State dichotomy is misleading as to the true nature of the EU, which 
deserves to be intellectually liberated from such binary thinking in favour of embrace of the 
virtues of multi-level constitutionalism as a model for governance. 
 
What is actually at stake is an acceptance that the increasingly dense involvement of the EU, 
and in particular the EC, in regulatory activity increases anxieties about the accountability to 
which it is subject. The two trends identified above involve two different choices as to the 
proper site of that accountability; first, European level, achieved by, for example, a deeper 
role for the European Parliament and a firmer stance on fundamental rights protection at 
European level and, second, national level, which is secured indirectly by placing closer 
limits on what the Community is permitted to achieve.
91 But in fact this is not a choice. Both 
elements combine to generate a credible level of legitimation for the activities pursued in the 
Union. 
 
This is the “either/or” problem. Much of what has been articulated above relates to a fruitful 
and constructive interrelation of State power and power exercised by European institutions. 
Beyond the descriptive I make the claim that this is very strongly supported by the normative 
claim that Europe must not be built on an either/ or model. I have argued above that the 
Union is not a state, is not on the road to becoming one and that it should not take that road. 
Instead it sets up a system of governance in which it and its Member States have distinct but 
complementary roles to play. “Multi-level governance” acts as a rather neat shorthand for 
describing the way in which Europe (and not only Europe) is the subject of many layers of 
intersecting legal and political authority, some territorially defined, others sectorally defined, 
not necessarily capable of subjection to a single, internally consistent rule of authority, yet 
working more or less successfully because of adaptation along the way and the vested interest 
of participants in avoiding conflict. I have described the European legal order, involving 
national courts and the European Court in this vein, but the phenomenon is much broader. It 
stands for multi-level constitutionalism, within which national and European level systems of 
governance interconnect. In this vein pioneering work by Pernice treats the European Union 
as a divided power system, and sees “a progressive constitution of legitimate institutions and 
powers at the European level, which are complementary to the national constitutions and 
designed to meet the challenges of an evolving global society”.
92 This points towards the 
growth of a coherent constitutional and institutional architecture for Europe, albeit that 
different sources of legal authority must be drawn on to make real this vision - the key being 
not to suppose that one source has any neceesary superiority (measured in any sense) over 
another. I find this a hugely appealing vision especially, as explained by Pernice, in so far as 
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it corrects historically mistaken attitudes to the “State” as necessary organising starting-point.  
 
In so far as markets outstrip States and generate patterns of regulation beyond the State, there 
then arises the need to shape institutions that will perform these transfrontier regulatory tasks 
and to fashion methods for supervision of their conduct. Multi-level constitutionalism 
possesses the singular attraction that it frees us from the trap that treats the increase in private 
economic power in supra-State domains as a basis for shifting extra public power to that 
same level, which would in turn draw demands for greater institutional accountability to be 
transplanted to that level, a process which is then seen to impoverish the domestic political 
sphere. This is a self-defeating prognosis. Instead a multi-level approach argues for the 
importance of different levels of governance in dealing with the growth of transnational 
economic activity. It builds a case that, in fact, the very combination of European institutional 
and constitutional architecture alongside those of the Member States itself secures a broader 
sense of democracy - a democracy which ensures the reflection and representation of interests 
outside a context which is dependent on and limited by State systems.
93 In this sense the 
argument is that European integration is itself democratic and can be legitimated by its 
capacity to inject into national political processes a legally enforceable duty to respect 
interests that are affected by decisions taken yet which are not capable or are inadequately 
capable of shaping those decisions through voting power as well as its capacity to improve 
the effective problem-solving capacity of States by providing a reliable framework for the 
taking of collective action. 
 
This requires judgements about European “democracy” to comprehend the full range of direct 
and indirect impacts of European norms.
94 In short, national-level decision-making assumes 
what does not exist - a stable set of consumers of those decisions, whose preferences will be 
fully satisfied by the national polity and who are not joined by other “external” affected 
parties. European law needs to correct these malfunctions, but without eliminating the State 
itself which plainly retains an indispensable but not unique role in sustaining the loyalty of 
citizens to adopted political decisions. This suggests a wider context which insists that the 
function of the European Union is to “tame” the nationalistic urges of its States by using legal 
rules to strip them of their capacity for harmful excesses.
95 
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There is a need to develop an institutionally and constitutionally inter-connected system of 
layers for achieving efficient and representative governance in Europe. This, therefore, 
asserts a formal legitimacy for the EU rooted in its Treaty but supplements this with a claim 
to legitimacy founded on its capacity to renovate and, fundamentally, to improve the 
responsiveness of (national) decision-makers to interests who are affected thereby and not 
simply to be satisfied with existing national assumptions. That is, European market-building 
is reflected not in European State-building but in making national systems more European. 
The core argument of this paper is that discussion of “constitutional finality” needs to be 
conducted in this light, but that there is a risk of neglecting the nuances. Particularly, the 
quest to construct a “hard list” of competences is symptomatic of the lurking “either/or” 
problem, which underplays the extent to which both Member States and the European Union 
depend on each other for the effective discharge of the full range of their political, economic 
and social tasks. And the problem is accentuated by the “delayed reaction” phenomenon, 
according to which insufficient account is taken of how the inherent dynamism of the EU 
institutional and constitutional system is already making strides to tackle the perceived 
problem of over-ambitious centralisation of power in Europe. 
 
It is correct to diagnose a certain confusion about what to “do” with the EU, now that it has 
clearly broken its bonds as a mere machine for the delivery of economic integration and has 
gradually accumulated state-like constitutional and institutional features, while performing 
ever wider functions. Fundamental questions about the nature, purpose and location of 
democratic legitimacy are attracting different types of response designed to cope with 
seepage of power to European level. On the one hand one observes care to impose limits on 
what the Community can do in part out of anxiety that it lacks sufficient legitimacy, on the 
other it drives towards increasing legitimacy at the European level by adding to the 
Community and/ or to the wider Union factors that reflect the State-like reach of its activities. 
My claim is that these are complementary approaches, that emphasise the proper roles of both 
States and the European institutions. Admittedly portrayal of the dynamic relationship that 
has been developed within the Union framework between the Member States and the 
institutions of the Community/ Union may, even if accepted as basically accurate, be 
criticised for its intransparency. Who can understand this labyrinth, other than the expert? 
And so, the complaint continues, the system loses legitimacy because of its obscurity. This is 
an important perception, and it argues for making more transparent the system of governance 
in Europe while appreciating that in so far as its virtues lie in its inter-connections and cross-
checks it cannot be subjected to a simple explanation. Gratifyingly, this appreciation is 
present in the Laeken Declaration and has played a role in at least some of the deliberations 
of the Convention. But, in the approach to 2004 and the rising tide of opinion which asserts 
that “something must be done!”, it is fundamentally important to avoid conflating the search 
for transparency and clarity in the EU with the case for a “Constitution”, especially in the 
context of a search for a “finality” that would involve the triumph of one vision over another. 
Both projects are served by a product that will look similar or even the same - a short, 
comprehensible document which will capture in words the essential features of the system. 
But the former, which I favour, would treat such a document (and indeed, as in the case of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, its very preparation) as an element in a process encouraging  
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informed public debate about what the Union is seeking to achieve and how it should go 
about doing so,
96 while the latter would alarm me deeply in so far as it would be designed to 
“solve” questions about the true site of political and legal authority in Europe. Any process 
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